Pashto Issue, Yesterday and Today

By Alexander Umnov, senior research officer at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

An offensive by Taliban in southern Afghanistan in spring shows clearly that the overthrow of their regime in Kabul has not led to the disappearance of the religious and political movement. Truly, the Taliban forces are mainly based in neighbouring Pakistan, especially in largely Pashto-populated Waziristan along the Afghan-Pakistani border rather than in Afghanistan. Islamabad has less control over the region but tribal structures sanctioned by Islam are quite strong, and Taliban plans to create an independent Islamic State there.

The Situation in Waziristan poses a danger to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which has long turned to a rival of Taliban from its ally. Islamabad suggested the construction of a barrier or protecting wall on the Pakistani-Afghan border. According to the Pakistani President, the move is aimed at preventing drug traffickers and Taliban militants from crossing the border. The proposal would have been welcomed by Kabul. However, Afghan President Hamid Karzai dismissed it. According to President Karzai a protecting wall could divide not only tribes but also families when the problem of the intrusion of Taliban militants has not been resolved yet.

What stands behind the Kabul's position is the old issue of the so-called Durand Line drawn by Britain between Afghanistan and its colony, India in 1893. Pakistan considers the line its border but Afghanistan refuses to recognize this. The motive behind Kabul's move is to attract the sympathy of Pashtos, the largest ethnic group in multinational Afghanistan rather than strive for expansion as insisted by its rivals. Meanwhile, consistent demonstration of adherence to the ideals of Pashto plays a significant role too. This seems to be logical since the heads of Afghan state have been as a rule also Pashtos. Moreover, Pashtos and Baluchis in Pakistan, influential ethnic minorities in the country press for broader autonomy and even independence and they lean on Afghanistan willingly.

A new state, Bangladesh appeared in the Eastern Province of Pakistan when it collapsed under the pressure of ethnic contradictions in the 70s of last century. Consequently, Afghanistan's support to Pashto and Baluchi nationalism worries Pakistan. An attempt to neutralize the threat was the support to Pashto Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan and local ethnic foes of Pashtos. Fundamentalists support Islamic revolution aimed at radical redistribution of power and property and dismiss the existence of border issues between Moslem states. Concerning ethnic counter balance it must be said that Tajiks, the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan will be given a key role.

This policy flourished during the Communist rule in Afghanistan. By pushing away Pashtos and non-Pashtos Kabul created quite favorable conditions for a play by Islamabad. Consequently, Pashto nationalism in Pakistan started at least partially to pursue an anti-Afghan policy. But Baluchi nationalism on the contrary preserved its pro-Kabul trend. The situation started to change after the Communists left the political scene. Pashto Islamic fundamentalists who gained strength in the fight against infidels quickly became exhausted. Revolution in the name of green banner impressed Afghan residents no less than that in the name of red banner. However, when Tajiks captured Kabul disintegrating trends started to gain momentum among multinational population, and this had affected the local Pashtos. The spontaneous unification of Afghan Pashtos with their brothers across the Durand Line had posed a serious threat to Pakistan.

By opposing this Pakistan promoted the establishment of the Taliban movement, which began rapidly to unite Afghanistan by supporting the restoration of previous forms of power and property and leaning on Pashtos first and foremost. However, Taliban movement clearly crossed the limits set by Islamabad when it intruded into the non-Pashto-populated territories. Originally, Pakistan's idea was to form united but loose state that reminds a federative structure. At the same time if Pashtos could establish their power in Kabul they should have been recon with practically autonomous non-Pashto groups. In these circumstances Afghanistan's tough position on Durand Line was unacceptable since that emphasized special position of Pashtos in the state. Naturally, newly unified Afghanistan with powerful Pashto rule is inevitably deemed to revive.

Taliban movement's unwillingness to take into account Islamabad's opinion had led to alienation between them. Consequently, breaking off relations between the two after the September 11 terrorist attacks involving allies of the Taliban movement and international terrorists was an expected move. The ousted of the Taliban regime by the United States has divided Afghanistan once again into ethnic quarters. However, head of the state is Hamid Karzai, a Pashto who is being supported by US and international forces in the country. Nevertheless, gathering Afghanistan around Kabul is going on quite slowly.

In these circumstances the Pashto and Baluchi issue has again aggravated in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pashto nationalism is divided into pro-Kabul and anti-Kabul as before but the nationalism of Pashtos who partially united with Taliban is becoming quite significant. By opposing both Afghanistan and Pakistan Pashto nationalism is becoming new serious factor in politics in the Middle East. Baluchi nationalism that has preserved firm anti-Islamabad and pro-Kabul trend keeps aloof on a background against this.